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COLORING OUTSIDE THE LINES: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR 
SEAMON’S ARTICLE DISMANTLING MONUMENTS 
Hope Babcock* 
In Dismantling Monuments,1 Professor Richard H. Seamon defends 
President Donald Trump’s recent proclamations modifying the 
boundaries of two national monuments, Grand Staircase-Escalante and 
Bears Ears, that Presidents Clinton and Obama each designated at the 
ends of their Administrations.2 Professor Seamon argues that the 
Antiquities Act3 does not authorize the creation of monuments as large as 
these,4 and that President Trump, who has a constitutional duty to take 
care that all laws are faithfully executed,5 must take action to correct these 
ultra vires acts. He has little doubt that reducing the size of a previously 
designated national monument is consistent with the text of the 
Antiquities Act, its legislative history, and the prior practice of former 
Presidents and earlier Congresses.6 He finds additional authority to 
rescind these designations in a puzzling maxim that since a greater power 
must be encompassed in a smaller one, reduction in the size of a 
previously designated monument implies the power to rescind it 
completely.7 He also finds support for his position in congressional 
silence in the face of similar action by prior presidents, as well as in the 
existence of a “general rule”8 that presidents should not “tie the hands” 
                                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Law; Director, Institute for Public Representation Environmental Law 
Clinic, Georgetown Law. 
 1. Richard H. Seamon, Dismantling Monuments, 70 FLA. L. REV. 553 (2018). 
 2.  Proclamation No. 9682, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,089 (Dec. 4, 2017) (modifying Grand 
Staircase-Escalante National Monument); Proclamation No. 9681, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,081 (Dec. 4, 
2017) (modifying Bears Ears National Monument); see also Jennifer Yachnin, Trump touts Utah 
rollbacks in row with Romney, E&E NEWS (Jan. 2, 2019) (“Despite opposition from conservation 
advocates, Trump undid protections for 85% of the 1.35-million-acre Bears Ears National 
Monument and nearly half of the 1.9 million acres in the Grand Staircase-Escalante National 
Monument. Those reductions are being challenged in federal court.”). 
 3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–33 (1906) (current version at 54 U.S.C. §§ 320301–320303 (2012)). 
 4. Grand Staircase-Escalante is 1,700,000 acres, Hope M. Babcock, Rescission of a 
Previously Designated National Monument: A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 37 STAN. 
ENVTL. L. J. 3, 8 (2017), and Bears Ears is 1,351,849 acres and is jointly managed by the Bureau 
of Land Management and the Forest Service. Bear Ears National Monument Questions & 
Answers, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.fed.us/sites/default/files/bear-ears-fact-sheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FM3R-YA25]. 
 5. U.S. Const. art. II. § 3 (“[H]e shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed . . . 
.”). President Trump reduced Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument to slightly less than 
50% of its original size and Bears Ears to 16% of its original size. Hannah Nordhaus, What 
Trump’s Shrinkage of National Monuments Actually Means, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Feb. 2, 2018), 
https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/12/trump-shrinks-bears-ears-grand-staircase-
escalante-national-monuments/ [https://perma.cc/V2S6-64SQ]. 
 6. Seamon, supra note 1, at 575–83.  
 7. Id. at 584–86. 
 8. Id. at 588. 
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of their successors.9 
Professor Seamon is not alone in making these arguments,10 as I am 
not alone in saying that Professor Seamon’s arguments, while well-
intentioned, are wrong.11 He exaggerates the persuasive power of 
congressional silence. He elevates the importance of the statute’s original 
intent. Professor Seamon and I read the text and legislative history of the 
Antiquities Act differently—he sees unlimited presidential power, I see 
limits.12 We disagree on how the law’s purpose has evolved over time 
and whether Congress, the courts, or both have curbed that evolution.13 
We disagree over the importance of § 204(j) of Federal Land Policy & 
Management Act (FLPMA), which I, and others,14 argue reconfirms the 
textual clarity of § 431 of the Antiquities Act that only Congress can 
rescind or modify the boundaries of a previously designated national 
monument.15 We also disagree about whether the President has an 
implied power to revoke or modify a previously designated monument—
he finds and celebrates that power, I find no such power and warn that its 
use would violate the separation of powers doctrine and well-established 
norms of delegated power.16 Most of these counter arguments can be 
found in my article, Rescission of a Previously Designated National 
                                                                                                                     
 9. Id. at 588–90. 
 10. See generally, e.g., John Yoo & Todd Gaziano, Presidential Authority to Revoke or 
Reduce National Monument Designations, AM. ENTER. INST. (2017). 
 11. See, e.g., Mark Squillace et al., Presidents Lack the Authority to Abolish or Diminish 
National Monuments, 103 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 56 (2017); see also Mark Squillace, The 
Monumental Legacy of the Antiquities Act of 1906, 37 GA. L. REV. 473, 475 (2003) (discussing 
the legacy and history of the Antiquities Act as well as proposals to reform or repeal it). 
 12. Compare Seamon, supra note 1, at 556 (arguing presidents have the power to revoke or 
abolish a previously designated national monument, especially when the power has been exercised 
contrary to the Act’s authorization), with  Babcock, supra note 4, at 52–65 (arguing, among other 
things, that neither the text of the Antiquities Act nor interpretive canons authorize a President to 
revoke or amend a prior President’ designation of a national monument). 
 13. Compare Seamon, supra note 1, at 579 (commenting on how presidents “have 
repeatedly diminished monuments,” and Congress has acquiesced in those actions), with Babcock, 
supra note 4, at 5, 16–18, 22–27 (contending that until President Trump “no President has ever 
rescinded a designation made by a prior President”, that congressional attempts to repeal or amend 
the Act consistently failed, and that courts have exercised maximum restraint in reviewing 
presidential designations).  
 14. See, e.g., Squillace et al., supra note 11, at 56 (contending FLPMA makes it clear that 
the President lacks implied authority to revoke or modify a previous designation). 
 15. Compare Seamon, supra note 1, at 597–99 (finding no support in FLPMA’s legislative 
history or text of § 204(j) for such a proposition), with Babcock, supra note 4, at 52–56 (arguing 
that § 204(j) reaffirmed the clarity of § 431 of the Antiquities Act that only Congress has the 
authority to rescind or modify a previously designated national monument).  
 16. Compare Seamon, supra note 1, at 584 (stating three reasons why a President has the 
implied power to revoke prior monument designations), with Babcock, supra note 4, at 61–65 
(rejecting that concept). 
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Monument: A Bad Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come.17  
But rather than engaging in hand-to-hand combat with Professor 
Seamon over who is right with respect to the specific arguments we each 
make, I think it may be more useful, certainly more interesting, to 
broaden the discussion to include: (1) the importance over time of an 
Act’s original intent; (2) the correct role of the Take Care Clause in the 
debate we are having; (3) the use of the interpretive canon of textual 
ambiguity18 to resolve our differences; and (4) the impact of his 
arguments on the separation of powers doctrine.  
I.  THE UNIMPORTANCE OF A LAW’S ORIGINAL INTENT AND MORE 
MODERN APPROACHES TO STATUTORY INTERPRETATION. 
The Antiquities Act is quite brief, surprisingly so when one considers 
how much public land has been protected under its aegis.19 Section 1 of 
the Act makes it a crime for anyone to “appropriate, excavate, injure, or 
destroy any historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or any object of 
antiquities” located on lands that the federal government owns or controls 
without permission from the agency with management authority over 
those lands.20 The penalties for violating this provision are quite severe—
either or both a fine, not to exceed five hundred dollars, or ninety days in 
jail at a court’s discretion.21 The Act’s most controversial provision is 
§ 431, which authorizes the President, “in his discretion,” “to declare by 
public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric 
structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest,” on federal 
lands, “to be national monuments.”22 The section also gives the President 
discretion “to reserve . . . parcels of land [which shall] in all cases . . . be 
confined to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and 
management of the objects to be protected.”23 The interpretation of § 431 
                                                                                                                     
 17. 37 STAN. L.J. 3 (2017). 
 18. See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, 
Textual Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (examining, 
among other things, the relationship between historical practices and textual ambiguity in a study 
of the Court’s decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning). 
 19. Monuments Protected Under the Antiquities Act, NAT’L PARKS CONSERVATION ASS’N 
(Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.npca.org/resources/2658-monuments-protected-under-the-
antiquities-act [https://perma.cc/NDR3-KUG5] (listing all the national monuments designated 
under the Antiquities Act). 
 20. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1906) (current version at 54 U.S.C. §§ 320301 (2012)). 
 21. Id.  
 22.  Id.  
 23. Id. Often ignored is § 432, which authorizes the Departments of Interior and Agriculture 
to issue “rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out” the Act’s provisions. 16 U.S.C. § 
432 (1906) (current version at 54 U.S.C. §§ 320302 (2012)). Although § 432 is a specific 
delegation of administrative authority to federal agencies to implement the law’s provisions, the 
section does not cede Congress’ superior legislative authority to interpret and implement the Act 
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is at the heart of Professor Seamon and my disagreement. 
While both Professor Seamon and I agree that the Antiquities Act was 
a product of legislative compromise and largely recount the same 
legislative history ending in its enactment,24 our agreement stops there. 
We disagree over the extent to which the final law left room for the 
protection of more than historical objects, such as large landscapes 
containing objects of historic or scientific interest, and over the amount 
of land required to protect those objects. I argue that those two questions 
are unresolved in either the legislative history or the law itself;25 
Professor Seamon argues the reverse.26 We also interpret Congress’ 
failure to check perceived Presidential excess very differently. He 
attributes Congress’ failure to curb what he calls “abuse” of the Act’s 
legislative intent to its institutional inability to act unilaterally. 
Comparing this to a president who “is as free as a cowboy.”27 I see in 
Congress’ inaction, its consistent resistance to the idea of curtailing the 
President’s designation authority––a demeanor made even more striking 
by the fact that over the years Congress has considered and rejected 
legislation seeking to rescind or even amend the Antiquities Act for many 
of the same reasons raised by today’s critics of the Act, like Professor 
Seamon.28 Professor Seamon’s failure to discuss how the courts have 
viewed the scope of the President’s powers under the Antiquities Act may 
be because, with only one exception,29 courts have generally sustained 
those actions.30 
Given the wide divergence in the views of the Act, how much weight 
                                                                                                                     
to the Administration. See Waynan v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43 (1825) (“Congress may 
certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself.”). 
 24. Compare Seamon, supra note 1, at 561–67 (emphasizing that part of the legislative 
history supports the Act’s narrow focus), with Babcock, supra note 4, at 13–16 (pointing out that 
the history left open the type of artifacts to be protected and the amount of land necessary to 
protect the object that was the subject of the designation). 
 25. Babcock, supra note 4, at 16. 
 26. Seamon, supra note 1, at 567 (“[T]he 1906 Act was designed to allow the President to 
designate discrete objects as national monuments and, for each such object, to reserve only the 
smallest amount of land necess[a]ry to protect that object.” (alteration in original) (internal 
quotations omitted)). 
 27. Seamon, supra note 1, at 574. 
 28. See Babcock, supra note 4, at 18 (discussing some of those criticisms). 
 29. Anaconda Copper Co. v. Andrus, 14 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1853, 1854 (D. Alaska 
1980) (challenging President Carter’s use of the statute to designate fifteen new national 
monuments, to expand the boundaries of two existing monuments, and to withdraw more than 
fifty-six million acres in Alaska to protect public lands until Congress enacted protective 
legislation). 
 30. See Wyoming v. Franke, 58 F. Supp. 890, 896 (D. Wyo. 1945) (“[I]f the Congress 
presumes to delegate its inherent authority to the Executive Departments which exercise 
acquisitive proclivities not actually intended, the burden is on the Congress to pass such remedial 
legislation as may obviate any injustice brought about as the power and control over and 
disposition of government lands inherently rests in its Legislative branch.”).  
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should be given to its intent? I argue not much. I believe of greater import 
is the practice of government institutions in implementing the statute. 
Here, contrary to Professor Seamon, practice shows presidents 
generously exercise their discretion to identify and then reserve areas 
under § 2 of the Antiquities Act, unchecked by the courts or Congress.31 
In the field of statutory interpretation the idea that “practice informs 
the content of constitutional law” is referred to as “historical gloss.”32 
Courts may and often do consider historical gloss when interpreting the 
meaning of a statutory text.33 Governmental practices can also be invoked 
to support “what legal and political theorists” term “constitutional 
conventions,” a catchall phrase used by legal and political theorists to 
cover those “maxims, beliefs, and principles” that “guide officials in how 
they exercise political discretion.”34 To act contrary to an historical gloss 
violates a legal understanding, while contradicting a convention violates 
“the spirit of the constitution, even if it does not violate any particular 
rule.”35 Thus, historical gloss has legal status and conventions do not.36 
Both interpretive approaches have some “normative force”— 
conventions more so outside the courts as they are not law-based. 
The cases discussed in Bradley and Siegel’s articles on interpreting 
constitutional text involve the allocation of power between Congress and 
the Executive Branch. In NLRB v. Noel Canning,37 for example, the Court 
wrote that since “the interpretive questions before it concern the 
allocation of power between two elected branches of Government . . . it 
would put significant weight upon historical practice,” even if “the nature 
or longevity of that practice is subject to dispute . . . .”38 Although not a 
matter of constitutional interpretation, the dispute over the meaning of 
§ 431 of the Antiquities Act, involves, among other things, the historical 
practices of the two elected branches of government. Thus, the resolution 
of that dispute might be amenable to consideration of historical gloss as 
                                                                                                                     
 31. Presidents have declared a 157 national monuments since the law’s enactment in 1906. 
Squillace et al., supra note 11, at 55.  
 32. Curtiss A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions and 
the Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L. REV. 255, 257 (2017) [hereinafter Bradley & Siegel, 
Historical Gloss]; see generally Bradley & Siegel, supra note 18 (analyzing the Court’s use of 
historical gloss in NLRB v. Noel Canning in the face of textual ambiguity and the concept of 
constitutional adverse possession). 
 33. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the 
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned . . . may be treated as a gloss on 
‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”). 
 34. Bradley & Siegel, Historical Gloss, supra note 32, at 257. 
 35. Id. at 257 (quoting Keith Whittington). 
 36. Id. at 268. 
 37. 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).  
 38. Id. at 2559–60. See also Bradley & Siegel, Historical Gloss, supra note 32, at 261. 
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a tool “to help clarify purportedly ambiguous text.”39 In the case of the 
Antiquities Act, historical practice conforms to a view of unfettered 
Presidential interpretive discretion, not to the cabined view of Professor 
Seamon. 
Constitutional conventions can also constrain the exercise of 
governmental authority. Bradley and Siegel suggest that violation of a 
convention is not simply an act of “bad policy, but a deviation from norms 
of good institutional citizenship that help sustain the constitutional 
system.”40 Thus, conventions, although not based on law, exercise a 
moral force on political actors that can be as powerful as a judicially 
enforced historical gloss put on some statutory text. To the extent that 
Professor Seamon is endorsing President Trump’s rescission of two 
previously designated national monuments, he is supporting the violation 
of those maxims and beliefs that give weight to prior actions taken under 
congressionally delegated authority.  
Use of neither interpretive approach supports Professor Seamon’s 
position that § 431 of the Antiquities Act constrains a president’s 
discretion to designate a national monument. In fact, consideration of past 
practices and maxims might ease the path to resolving open textual 
questions like what constitutes an object of scientific interest or the size 
of the reservation. 
II.  PROFESSOR SEAMON’S ARGUMENT ON THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE 
IS UNAVAILING. 
Professor Seamon argues that the President’s duty to take care that 
laws passed by Congress are faithfully executed imposes an affirmative 
duty on the President to “modify or abolish” any national monument 
designated by a prior President in violation of law.41 He argues that the 
Take Care Clause makes a President responsible for violations of federal 
laws, even if he was not the cause of those violations.42 However, in 
support of that proposition, Professor Seamon cites inapposite cases. Two 
cases, Myers v. United States43 and Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. 
Accounting Oversight Board,44 involve the Court striking down laws that 
restricted the President’s authority to remove subordinates45—not an 
issue here. A third case, Printz v. United States,46 invalidated a law that 
transferred federal authority for executing a federal law to state and local 
                                                                                                                     
 39. Id. at 263. 
 40. Id. at 266. 
 41. Seamon, supra note 1, at 588. 
 42. Id. at 586. 
 43. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
 44. 561 U.S. 477 (2010). 
 45.  See id. at 513–14; Myers, 272 U.S. at 176.  
 46. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
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law enforcement agents over whom the President had no control47—also 
not pertinent to the situation at hand. The final case he cites, Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife,48 involves plaintiffs’ standing to challenge a 
federal law.49 The statement from the case quoted in Professor Seamon’s 
article that such an interpretation would unconstitutionally “transfer from 
the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most important 
constitutional duty, ‘to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,’”50 
is dicta, taken entirely out of context. To say that “these decision require 
interpreting the Antiquities Act to allow the President to modify or 
abolish a monument established by a prior president”51 is a stretch.  
Professor Seamon is right that the Take Care Clause together with 
Article II imposes on the President the responsibility to be sure that laws 
enacted by Congress are implemented as Congress intended. Indeed, 
courts view that clause “as the direct constitutional source of the 
President’s obligation to respect legislative supremacy” and not to act 
contrary to law.52 However, there is nothing in the Take Care Clause or 
in how courts have interpreted it that makes the President responsible for 
upholding any law or for preventing its violation. For certain, application 
of the Clause here does not enable President Trump to waive language in 
FLPMA preventing him from affecting a prior President’s designation of 
a national monument or accreting to himself the power to rescind or 
modify an existing monument, when the only authority granted to the 
President by the Antiquities Act is to identify and protect historic 
structures and objects of scientific interest.53 Ironically, the Take Care 
Clause prevents him from doing those things.  
“[A]ny authority conferred by the Take Care Clause ‘starts and ends 
with the laws Congress has enacted.’”54 The Take Care Clause prevents 
the President from creating exceptions to, or exemptions from, a 
legislative directive.55 Yet, this is exactly what President Trump has done 
by substantially modifying the boundaries of two previously designated 
national monuments—actions Professor Seamon endorses. As such, these 
actions are “highly suspect”56 and certainly outside the province of the 
Take Care Clause. 
                                                                                                                     
 47.  Id. at 933. 
 48. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 49.  Id. at 557–58.  
 50. Seamon, supra note 1, at 587 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577). 
 51. Id. at 588. 
 52. Babcock, supra note 4, at 68–69. 
 53. Id. at 69–70. 
 54. Id. at 70 (quoting Jack Goldsmith & John Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 
164 U. PA. L. REV. 1835, 1850 (2016)). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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III.  THE INVERTED ARGUMENT THAT THE POWER TO REDUCE IMPLIES 
THE POWER TO RESCIND AND THE SELF-LABELED “RULE” THAT 
PRESIDENTS SHOULD “NOT TIE THE HANDS OF THEIR SUCCESSORS” ARE 
UNPERSUASIVE. 
Although Professor Seamon equates them, reduce and rescind are very 
different concepts—to rescind is to revoke, void, annul, or cancel 
something, while to reduce is to decrease or lessen something, not to 
abolish it. The power to reduce the size of something is a lesser power 
than to cancel something completely. It defies logic to propound, as 
Professor Seamon does, that a greater power can fit within a lesser power 
and that the lesser power can imply the existence of a greater power.57  
Contrary to Professor Seamon, a President being able to reduce the 
size of a previously designated monument because of a mistake in its 
boundaries or in the existence of the objects the monument was 
established to protect does not logically “compel the conclusion” that a 
subsequent President can revoke that designation.58 Even if that were 
true, President Trump’s proclamations are not an example of his 
correcting any errors Presidents Clinton or Obama made in their 
designations. Rather, his proclamations reconfiguring their designations 
reflect a policy disagreement with his predecessors over how much land 
should have been reserved.  
Executive actions taken pursuant to a legislative delegation, like 
proclamations designating national monuments, do bind the hands of 
subsequent executives. Professor Seamon’s attempt to equate a 
presidential proclamation issued under § 431 of the Antiquities Act with 
an ordinary executive order, so it can be easily modified,59 understates 
the role of Congress in the former.60 “[T]he fact that presidential 
proclamations designating national monuments are issued under the 
authority of the Antiquities Act gives them more than the usual hortatory 
                                                                                                                     
 57. See Seamon, supra note 1, at 584–86 (“If the President can reduce a monument to 
exclude lands that the President determines were not properly included in the first place, logic 
compels the conclusion that the President can abolish a monument that the President determines 
was not properly created in the first place—say, because it did not contain antiquities entitled to 
protection under the Act.”). 
 58. Id. at 585. 
 59. Id. at 588 (“[T]he difference between Executive orders and proclamations is more one 
of form than of substance.”).  
60.Professor Seamon mistakenly equates presidential action under a specific congressional 
mandate with presidential executive orders, the over-riding of which he correctly finds common. 
See id.; see also Pamela Baldwin, CRS Report for Congress: Authority of a President to Modify 
or Eliminate a National Monument (2000), 
http://congressionalresearch.com/RS20647/document.php?study=Authority+of+a+President+to
+Modify+or+Eliminate+a+National+Monument [https://perma.cc/G3YG-XN73] (commenting 
that executive orders relate to intra-executive branch actions). 
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power with respect to the general public”;61 unlike an executive order, 
they tie the hands of subsequent presidents unless Congress steps in. 
IV.  PROFESSOR SEAMON’S ARGUMENTS UNDERCUT THE SEPARATION OF 
POWERS DOCTRINE. 
Although the separation of powers doctrine is not stated in the text of 
the Constitution, it is “an indispensable part of our theory of politics” in 
this country, indeed of “our American constitutionalism.”62 Respect for 
the functional distinctiveness of the three branches of government 
underlies the doctrine, and courts guard against one branch encroaching 
into the province of the others or any “aggrandizement” of power by one 
branch to the detriment of the other two that would destabilize the balance 
of power among them.63 I contend in my article that any action by a sitting 
President to rescind or modify a previously designated national 
monument, a power that Congress reserved to itself in the Antiquities 
Act, impermissibly encroaches on the powers of the Legislative Branch 
and violates the separation of powers doctrine.64 
By advocating that President Trump has this authority, Professor 
Seamon is suggesting that the President can engage in a legislative 
function—the amendment of a law, here the FLPMA, by excising an 
offending provision, § 204(j), which prohibits a President from affecting 
in any way a prior President’s designation.65 In § 204(j), Congress made 
its policy preferences clear that designations by prior presidents cannot 
be modified or revoked. Professor Seamon is correct that language 
denying this power to the Secretary did not reserve it to Congress.66 But 
that does not change the essential fact that Congress enacted the 
Antiquities Act under its sole authority “to dispose of and make all 
needful Rules and Regulations” governing federal lands,67 and that a 
President, who designates a national monument, is acting under and 
within that authority. Therefore, only Congress has the power to affect a 
previous designation—here, the lesser power to revoke or rescind a 
pervious designation is clearly encompassed in the greater, power to 
designate in the first place. To the extent that those earlier actions by 
previous presidents exceeded delegated authority in the Antiquities Act, 
                                                                                                                     
 61. Babcock, supra note 4, at 10. 
 62. Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice, 54 B.C. L. REV. 433, 
436 (2013). 
 63. Babcock, supra note 4, at 67. 
 64. See id. at 70. 
 65. See id. at 70–72 (equating presidents ignoring specific congressional directives with 
their refusing to enforce a law or comply with directives about how a law should be complied 
with). 
 66. Seamon, supra note 1, at 597. 
 67. See U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
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corrective action lies in the Legislative, not the Executive Branch, as the 
Judicial Branch has made clear; to argue otherwise subverts the 
separation of powers doctrine. 
Much separates Professor Seamon and me regarding the extent to 
which the Antiquities Act binds subsequent Presidents to respect the 
actions of their predecessors. Less apparent are the weaknesses in the 
rationales Professor Seamon uses to support President Trump’s action 
modifying his predecessors designation, including the reliance on the 
Act’s original intent, the robust interpretation of the Take Care Clause 
imbuing the President with untethered corrective powers, the imaginative 
re-imagining of certain sophisms, and the subversive reading of the 
separation of powers doctrine which perversely vests in the President the 
very powers President Trump accuses Presidents Clinton and Obama of 
improperly using—coloring outside the statutory lines. But our 
disagreements are not surprising. They reflect the incessant debate over 
the use of our public lands that have historically divided this country and, 
in all likelihood, will continue to divide us as long as those lands exist. 
